

1 **Title**

2 What is the origin of Livestock-associated MRSA CC398 isolates from humans without
3 livestock contact: an epidemiological and genetic analysis.

4

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18 **Running head**

19 LA-MRSA CC398 from humans without livestock contact

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23 **Abstract**

24 Fifteen percent of all MRSA CC398 human carriers detected in The Netherlands had not been
25 in direct contact with pigs or veal calves. To ensure low MRSA prevalence it is important to
26 investigate the likely origin of these MRSA of unknown origin (MUO). Recently, it was
27 shown that CC398 originating from humans and animals differ in the presence of specific
28 mobile genetic elements (MGEs). We hypothesized that determining these specific MGEs in
29 MUO isolates and comparing them with a set of CC398 isolated from various known origin,
30 could provide clues to their origin. MUO CC398 isolates were compared to MRSA CC398
31 isolates obtained from humans with known risk factors, an MRSA CC398 outbreak isolate,
32 LA-MRSA CC398 isolates from pigs, horses, chickens and veal calves, and five MSSA
33 CC398 from known human origin. All strains were *spa*-typed and the presence or absence of,
34 *scn*, *chp*, $\phi 3$ *int*, $\phi 6$ *int*, $\phi 7$ *int*, *rep7*, *rep27* and *cadDX* was determined by PCR. The MRSA
35 CC398 in humans, MUO or MKO, resembled MRSA CC398 as found in pigs, and not MSSA
36 CC398 as found in humans. The distinct human MSSA CC398 *spa*-type, t571, was not
37 present among our MRSA CC398 strains, MRSA CC398 were tetracycline resistant and
38 carried no $\phi 3$ bacteriophage with *scn* and *chp*. We showed by simple PCR means that human
39 MUO CC398 carriers carried MRSA from livestock origin, suggestive for indirect
40 transmission. . Although the exact transmission route remains unknown, direct human-to-
41 human transmission remains a possibility as well.

42

43 **Introduction**

44 In The Netherlands, the prevalence of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) is
45 low (1) and Dutch MRSA strains display a broad clonal diversity (2). One exception is the
46 livestock-associated clone CC398, a major clonal reservoir in pigs and veal calves (3) and
47 subsequently people with occupational exposure to animals. The reported number of MRSA
48 CC398 has been around 40% of reported MRSA to the Dutch MRSA surveillance since 2008
49 (2, 4). However, only 78% of reported CC398 are found through screening of patients with
50 direct (occupational) contact to pigs or veal calves at hospital admission (a risk factor
51 introduced in 2006) (5).

52 The remaining MRSA CC398 carriers do not comply to the described risk factors in the
53 Dutch MRSA guideline: contact with industrial, live pigs, veal calves or broiler chickens
54 regardless whether this contact was occupational or not and/or the person lives on such a
55 farm. Currently 15% (352/2312) of all Dutch and 15% (24/164) of all Danish MRSA CC398
56 carriers have not been in direct contact with pigs or veal calves (2, 4). In The Netherlands,
57 these MRSA CC398 carriers are considered a MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO) subgroup
58 (MUO CC398). With MUO being any MRSA reported to the MRSA surveillance without
59 known risk factors as defined in the Dutch MRSA guideline (4).

60 The reservoir or transmission route of MUO CC398 still remains unknown: possible
61 transmission routes are direct animal-to-human transmission of animal sources not included
62 as risk factor in the MRSA guideline (due to being unknown or a limited effect on the
63 population as a whole), indirect animal-to-human transmission, through the environment e.g.
64 by dust or air vehicle (6, 7), animal products such as meat (8), or human-to-human
65 transmission (9). Hospital outbreaks of CC398 have been described illustrating the potential
66 of human-to-human transmission by this clonal complex (10). Although the general thought is
67 that long term colonization of CC398 in humans is rare, it was recently shown that CC398

68 from animal origin *can* survive in a human nose, for at least 21 days, suggesting their ability
69 to colonize humans (11). MUO CC398 is therefore an important topic, and the necessity to
70 elucidate the origin of MRSA CC398 in humans without direct contact to pigs or veal calves
71 (MUO CC398) is clear.

72 From genomic analyses on CC398 of different origins it can be concluded that the origin of
73 CC398 is most likely human (12, 13). There are indications that methicillin-susceptible
74 *Staphylococcus aureus* (MSSA) CC398 switched host in the past as result of human-animal
75 interaction (12, 14), and that it adapted to animals by losing several Mobile Genetic Elements
76 (MGEs) while gaining other MGEs, including resistance to tetracyclines and methicillin,
77 before being reintroduced in humans as MRSA (3, 15).

78 McCarthy et al. showed that CC398 from humans in contact with animals, differed from
79 strains isolated from humans without contact with animals. The difference was seen in MGE-
80 located genes, e.g. $\phi 3$ *int*, *chp*, *scn*, *rep27*, $\phi 7$ *int* and *cadDX* for humans, and *rep7*, $\phi 6$ *int* for
81 pigs, in addition to genes encoding resistance to tetracycline and trimethoprim (14). We
82 therefore hypothesized that presence of these MGE-encoding genes, but also the resistance to
83 tetracycline and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, could be used as a cheap and fast method to
84 compare MUO CC398 with isolates from humans (MSSA and MKO CC398) and animals
85 (MRSA CC398) to predict the origin of the MUO CC398 in The Netherlands.

86 We showed that MUO and MKO isolates resembled CC398 isolates from animal origin more
87 closely than CC398 isolated from human origin, indicating that these MUO CC398 most
88 probably originated from livestock.

89

90 **Materials and Methods**

91 Bacterial strains and growth conditions

92 In total 119 isolates were included in the study (Figure 1). All isolates were predicted to have
93 a CC398 background, based on MLVA typing. (<http://www.mlva.net/>) MLVA is the National
94 Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) choice, due to costs, as well as there
95 being an agreement between MLVA and MLST. Only STs belonging to the same MLST
96 clonal complex were grouped by MLVA. Furthermore, *spa*-types show a remarkable
97 agreement between the *spa*-types associated with MLST clonal complexes and the MLVA
98 complexes (16). The MLVA complexes were therefore named in accordance to the MLST
99 one. The MLVA complex 398 is thus equal to the MLST clonal complex 398. The isolates
100 were all from The Netherlands and from 2009, except an outbreak strain from 2007 and five
101 MSSA isolates from human origin, previously described and isolated at the Erasmus MC in
102 the period of 1998-1999 and 2002 (13, 17). All CC398 *S.aureus* isolates were stored at -80°C
103 and grown on sheep blood agar plates (RBS) (Becton, Dickinson & Co., Belgium) at 37°C
104 overnight.

106 Bacterial strain selection from animals

107 The 80 MRSA strains of animal origin included in this study were previously collected from
108 livestock: pigs (n=24), veal calves (n=20), chickens (n=20) and horses (n=16). The pig
109 isolates were from apparently healthy animals and originated from eight different farms
110 across The Netherlands that were screened as part of a pilot for a later study by Broens *et al.*
111 (18). The healthy veal calves were sampled at arrival on three Dutch farms (19). The horse
112 strains were nearly all (94%) samples from diseased horses that visited the Utrecht University
113 equine clinic, the remaining 6% being healthy horses. The chicken isolates were obtained
114 from a study in six broiler slaughterhouses, where broilers from 40 flocks arriving at the
115 slaughterhouses were sampled in the pharynx after stunning (20). *S. aureus* isolates were *spa*-
116 typed by the RIVM according to Harmsen *et al.* (21). From the available livestock MRSA

117 isolates (n=459) the largest variability in *spa*-types was chosen (n=80) (figure 2); whether an
118 isolate from either screening or a clinical case, was not a selection criterion. This resulted in a
119 selection with both screening and clinical isolates.

120

121 Bacterial strains selection from humans

122 The MRSA strains of human origin included an outbreak strain (n=1), MUO (n=6) and MKO
123 (n=27). The outbreak strain reported in 2007 was chosen because it caused nine secondary
124 cases (both patients and healthcare workers) in a single Dutch hospital after MRSA was
125 cultured from a diabetic foot ulcer of a patient on a surgical ward (10). Both MUO (n=6) as
126 MKO (n=27) were from a previous study, in which an extended questionnaire was sent to
127 MRSA carriers. Five MSSA isolates were also from human origin. These isolates were
128 previously described and isolated at the Erasmus MC in the period of 1998-1999 and 2002
129 (13, 17).

130

131 Extended questionnaire study

132 Around 3000 MRSA are reported to the Dutch national MRSA surveillance by medical
133 microbiological laboratories from The Netherlands with epidemiological data on applicable
134 risk groups (2, 5). Potential MUO carriers reported to the surveillance, were approached by
135 extended questionnaire. The questionnaire was set up to determine the known risk factors for
136 MRSA, as described in the Dutch WIP guideline on MRSA (Supplementary Table 1)(4), as
137 well as further questions on risk factors as described in the literature, which was searched in
138 PubMed up till 01-01-2010, using search keywords 'MRSA' and 'risk factor' (Supplementary
139 Table 2).

140

141 *S. aureus* genotyping, detection of expression of β -haemolysin and DNA isolation

142 After overnight culture on RBS plates, haemolysin patterns were determined to detect
143 expression of β -haemolysin. No expression of β -haemolysin indicates the insertion of the $\phi 3$
144 bacteriophage into the bacterial genome, as $\phi 3$ inserts on the site that codes for β -haemolysin
145 (22). DNA was isolated, using a MagNA Pure (Roche) according to the protocol supplied by
146 the Manufacturer.

147

148 Mobile Genetic Elements

149 The presence or absence of MGEs was determined by PCR's specific for: *cadDX*, $\phi 3$ *int*, *scn*,
150 *chp*, *rep7*, *rep27*, $\phi 6$ *int* and $\phi 7$ *int* (14, 22, 23). Primers for $\phi 3$ *int* (Forward primer:
151 TCCGGCTTCTTTGAAAATGT, Reverse primer: CCGGAAAACCTACGAAGTCA,
152 amplicon size 220-323bp, annealing temperature 50°C.) and *cadDX* (Forward primer:
153 TGATGTGATCTGTGTACATGAGGA, Reverse primer:
154 TGATGTGAAGTTGAAGCAACA, amplicon size: 207bp, annealing temperature 60°C)
155 were designed with primer3 software (<http://frodo.wi.mit.edu/>). All amplified PCR products
156 were visualized by agarose gel (1.2%) electrophoresis. (See also Supplementary Table 3 and
157 4.)

158

159 Antimicrobial susceptibility

160 To determine antimicrobial susceptibility of *S. aureus* strains, standard disc diffusion method
161 was applied using Oxoid™ antimicrobial susceptibility test discs (Thermo Fisher Scientific,
162 Waltham USA) on MH-agar plates. The Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI)
163 breakpoints were used for tetracycline (zone diameter breakpoints: S ≥ 19 mm, I 15-18 mm, R
164 ≤ 14 mm.) and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole (zone diameter breakpoints: S ≥ 16 mm, I 11-15
165 mm, R ≤ 10 mm) (24).

166

167 Statistical analysis

168 Statistical analysis was performed with SAS Enterprise Guide software (version 4.2 by SAS
169 Institute Inc., North Carolina, USA) using 2x2 tables and Fisher's exact test. P-values of
170 <0.01 were considered significant to correct for multiple testing. A comparison was made
171 between animal and human hosts, as well as between human epidemiological subgroups.
172 Isolates were clustered transversally, using the Jaccard coefficient, on MGE presence, β -
173 haemolysin expression and susceptibility for tetracycline and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole.
174 The dendrogram was created based on UPGMA with Jaccard similarity.

175

176 **Results**

177 Two hundred and seventy-seven suspected MUO carriers from all of The Netherlands were
178 approached by an extended questionnaire, of which 42% (116) responded and 33 were
179 defined as CC398 carriers. Of these 33 CC398, 6 were MUO (CC398) and confirmed to have
180 had no contact with pigs, veal calves or (broiler) chickens in the year before questioning. The
181 MUO CC398 carriers were found to reside in the Dutch province 'Noord Brabant' where
182 there is generally more pig farming.

183 All MUO and MKO CC398 strains were distinctly different from human MSSA CC398 not
184 only in *spa*-type, but also based on β -haemolysin expression, tetracycline resistance, lacking
185 $\phi 3$ *int*, *scn* and *chp* genes. The human MRSA CC398 strains resemble animal MRSA CC398
186 strains (Figure 3). The presence of *cadDX* and *rep27*, considered human-associated genetic
187 markers, as they were highly prevalent in human MSSA and significantly less prevalent in
188 animal MRSA (14), were absent in MUO and few in MKO strains: *cadDX* (0/6 for MUO and
189 9/27 for MKO) and *rep27* (0/6 for MUO and 4/27 for MKO). In horse and pig isolates,
190 *cadDX* was almost absent, while in veal calf and chicken isolates *cadDX* was found
191 frequently: veal calves (16/20; 80%) and chickens (12/20; 60%). *Rep27* was absent in horse

192 and veal calf isolates, and only incidentally found in chickens and pigs: 8% (2/24) for pigs
193 and 20% (4/20) for chickens. All 119 isolates of both MRSA and MSSA isolates were similar
194 in full susceptibility for trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole. Also, there was no significant
195 difference between MUO and MKO in *rep7*, *rep27*, *φ6 int*, and *cadDX* content, resulting in
196 MUO and MKO clustering together, despite some minor differences in MGE content.
197 When the combined data of MUO and MKO were compared to animal isolates, it was clear
198 that human isolates were less often *φ6 int* positive than MRSA from veal calves or horse
199 isolates ($p < 0.01$), more often *rep7* positive than horse isolates ($p < 0.01$), more *rep27* positive
200 than pig isolates ($p < 0.01$) and less *cadDX* positive than isolates from veal calves and chickens
201 ($p < 0.01$). No significant differences between MRSA isolates from human subgroups (MUO,
202 MKO, outbreak) were found for *rep27*. Interestingly, the hospital outbreak strain lacked any
203 previously mentioned human or pig-associated markers (*rep7*, *rep27*, *φ3*, *φ6 int*, and *cadDX*),
204 but displayed tetracycline resistance. MGE variation within a single *spa*-type was observed
205 for human as well as animal isolates (Figure 3).

206

207 Discussion

208 Human MRSA CC398 isolates (MUO and MKO) in this study resembled animal MRSA
209 CC398 more than they resembled human MSSA CC398, because they were β -haemolysin
210 producers, tetracycline resistant, had similar MGE patterns, and had *spa*-types similar to those
211 found in animals. Furthermore, our MUO in cluster analysis almost always clustered together
212 with MKO. The similarity between MUO CC398, MKO CC398 and animal MRSA CC398
213 suggest that these MUO CC398 belong to the same MRSA clade originating in animals, and
214 that these MUO CC398 are not part of the MSSA CC398 clade detected in humans. Stegger *et*
215 *al.* found two distinct phylogenetic clades based on single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs),
216 revealing a basal human clade and a more derived livestock clade (25). Although no whole-

217 genome sequencing or SNP-analysis was done, the outcome of our cheaper and quicker
218 MGE-based method strongly suggests that these MUO CC398 belong to the livestock clade
219 with MKO CC398 and MRSA CC398 from animals, and not to the MSSA CC398 clade
220 found in humans. The lack of risk factors in our MUO CC398 carriers suggest spread of
221 animal MRSA CC398 by other means than currently described in the MRSA guideline.
222 The exact mode of transmission remains unanswered. An indirect route of transmission would
223 be the most likely mode of transmission for MUO CC398, taking into consideration where the
224 MUO CC398 carriers live, their lack of contact with pigs and veal calves, but also their lack
225 of contact with horses and chickens. Since, living in high-density pig areas (6), as well as
226 private farm visits (26), was a risk factor for livestock-associated MRSA carriage, modes of
227 indirect transmission are most likely through area contamination in which people live and
228 interact. Considering *S. aureus* survival in the environment and subsequent spread by air over
229 large distances (7), transmission by air is a possibility (27), as well as transmission by vectors
230 such as rodents (28). Nevertheless, transmission by human-to-human contact cannot be ruled
231 out: of the six MUO CC398 carriers investigated by extended questionnaire in this study, one
232 MUO CC398 carrier stated to have had contact with an MRSA carrier (unknown who or
233 which MRSA type) outside the family or household, while another had visited a farm without
234 contact to animals. Neither is currently considered an at risk event. In the Dutch guideline
235 MRSA positive household members are considered as a risk, but contact outside the
236 household or hospital, in the community, is not.

237 We know that a CC398 pig MRSA, lacking $\phi 3$, can survive up till 21 days in a human nose
238 (11), whereas $\phi 3$ is currently considered to be *the* marker for human host adaptation (12). The
239 successful outbreak isolate reported by Wulf et al (10), lacked $\phi 3$ as well. Human host
240 adaptation is explained by more than $\phi 3$ alone or host adaptation might not have to be as
241 extensive to facilitate transmission. In regards to the outbreak isolate, further research is

242 necessary to determine what makes this outbreak isolate so different and successful compared
243 to other human MRSA isolates.

244 Despite no significant difference between MUO and MKO for genes encoded by MGEs, there
245 were slight differences observed for *cadDX* and *rep7* between MUO and MKO. Furthermore,
246 *rep7* positive isolates were as common in MKO as in animals, unlike MUO which showed
247 significantly less *rep7* than among pig strains ($p < 0.01$). *rep7* and *rep27* genes are typical of
248 small plasmids encoding resistance genes, and *rep7* is reported to be associated with the
249 tetracycline resistance gene, *tetK* (29). We also observed MGE variation within single *spa*-
250 types within humans or animals, as can best be seen in t011 and t108, fitting the known
251 relative stability of MGE (30).

252 As for limitations of this study, we do not know whether our isolates were obtained from
253 persistent MRSA carriers or transient carriers (contaminated humans). Follow-up data are
254 important to better understand host adaptation, but since this was a retrospective study, carrier
255 data over time was unfortunately not available. This study's strength is the questionnaire that
256 allowed discrimination between MRSA CC398 with and without known risk factors,
257 regardless of guideline changes. The number of MUO CC398 are few in this study as 28%
258 (33/116) of respondents was a CC398 carrier, and only 21% (6/33) fitted the MUO definition.
259 However, the number of MUO CC398 per year is just over 5% for The Netherlands, which
260 means on average an additional 150 Dutch people with a MRSA CC398 while lacking risk
261 factors as described in the Dutch MRSA guideline (2012). We showed by simple PCR means
262 that MUO CC398 carriers in this study carry MRSA from CC398 livestock origin. This
263 finding is suggestive for an indirect transmission route, possibly the environment (air, water)
264 or through fomites, but we cannot rule out direct human-to-human transmission. Although,
265 the reported numbers of MUO CC398 in The Netherlands are currently still small, the
266 problem may increase, giving rise to more CC398 transmission and human host adaptation.

267

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393 **Figures and tables**

394 **Figure 1 – Flowchart**

395

396 MUO: MRSA without known risk factors as described by the Dutch national guideline .

397 MKO: MRSA with known risk factors as described by the Dutch national guideline. A CC398

398 MKO is a pig-, veal calf, farmer or a person with direct contact to pigs and/or veal calves, or

399 living on a pig or veal calf farm, or a broiler chicken handler. RIVM, National Institute for

400 Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands.

401

402 **Figure 2 – Selected *spa*-types for human and animal groups**

403

404 MKO: MRSA of Known Origin (known risk factors described in Dutch MRSA guideline),

405 MSSA: Methicillin susceptible *Staphylococcus aureus*, MUO: MRSA of Unknown Origin

406 (unknown risk factors not described in Dutch MRSA guideline 2012), Outbreak isolate

407 described by Wulf et al. Euro Surveill. 2008 Feb 28;13(9).

408 **Figure 3 – Results of β -haemolysin screening, PCR typing and susceptibility testing**

409

410 Isolates were clustered transversally, using the Jaccard coefficient, on MGE presence, β -
411 haemolysin expression and susceptibility for tetracycline and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole.

412 The dendrogram was created based on UPGMA with Jaccard similarity. Epidemiological
413 subtypes in humans: MKO (MRSA of Known Origin; MRSA with known risk factors for
414 acquisition), MUO (MRSA of Unknown Origin: MRSA with unknown risk factors for
415 acquisition). “MUO 2007” were MUO according to the 2007 guideline definition, but no
416 longer under the 2012 guideline definition. “MUO 2012” are MUO according to the current
417 guideline of December 2012. Outbreak (An isolate involved from a MRSA CC398 outbreak
418 in a Dutch hospital: described by Wulf et al. Euro Surveill. 2008.), Mobile genetic elements:
419 *chp* (Gene encoding chemotaxis-inhibiting protein (CHIPS). This gene is found in the ϕ 3-
420 bacteriophage that contains the Immune Evasion Complex (IEC) of which *chp* is sometimes
421 part of), *scn* (Gene encoding Staphylococcal complement inhibitor (SCIN). This gene is found
422 in the ϕ 3-bacteriophage that contains the Immune Evasion Complex (IEC) of which *scn* is
423 sometimes part of), Φ 3 *int* (Integrase gene of bacteriophage 3), Φ 6 *int* (Integrase gene of
424 bacteriophage 6), Φ 7 *int* (Integrase gene of bacteriophage 7), *rep*7 (Replication protein 7),
425 *rep*27 (Replication protein 27), *cadDX* (Operon of gene *cadX* (cad operon regulatory protein),
426 which encodes resistance against the heavy metal cadmium), Antimicrobial susceptibility:
427 Tetracycline (Tetracycline susceptibility testing), Trim./sulfa.
428 (Trimethoprim/Sulfamethoxazole susceptibility testing).





